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Abstract. We provide constructions of multilinear groups equipped with natural hard
problems from indistinguishability obfuscation, homomorphic encryption, and NIZKs.
This complements known results on the constructions of indistinguishability obfus-
cators from multilinear maps in the reverse direction. We provide two distinct, but
closely related constructions and show that multilinear analogues of the DDH assump-
tion hold for them. Our first construction is symmetric and comes with a κ-linear map
e : Gκ −→ GT for prime-order groups G and GT . To establish the hardness of the
κ-linear DDH problem, we rely on the existence of a base group for which the κ-strong
DDH assumption holds. Our second construction is for the asymmetric setting, where
e : G1 ×· · ·×Gκ −→ GT for a collection of κ +1 prime-order groups Gi and GT , and
relies only on the 1-strong DDH assumption in its base group. In both constructions, the
linearity κ can be set to any arbitrary but a priori fixed polynomial value in the security
parameter. We rely on a number of powerful tools in our constructions: probabilistic
indistinguishability obfuscation, dual-mode NIZK proof systems (with perfect sound-
ness, witness-indistinguishability, and zero knowledge), and additively homomorphic
encryption for the group Z+
N
. At a high level, we enable “bootstrapping” multilinear
assumptions from their simpler counterparts in standard cryptographic groups and show
the equivalence of PIO and multilinear maps under the existence of the aforementioned
primitives.
∗This paper has been handled by Ivan Bjerre Damgård as acting editor in chief and communicated by Alon
Rosen.
© The Author(s) 2019
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1. Introduction
1.1. Main Contribution
In this paper, we explore the relationship between multilinear maps and obfuscation.
Our main contribution is a construction of multilinear maps for groups of prime order
equipped with natural hard problems, using indistinguishability obfuscation (IO) in
combination with other tools, namely NIZK proofs, homomorphic encryption, and a base
group G0 satisfying a mild cryptographic assumption. This complements known results
in the reverse direction, showing that various forms of indistinguishability obfuscation
can be constructed from multilinear maps [17,24,45]. The relationship between IO
and multilinear maps is a very natural question to study, given the rich diversity of
cryptographic constructions that have been obtained from both multilinear maps and
obfuscation, and the apparent fragility of current constructions for multilinear maps.
More on this below.
We provide two distinct but closely related constructions. One is for multilinear maps
in the symmetric setting, that is, non-degenerate multilinear maps e : G1
κ −→ GT for
groups G1 and GT of prime order N . Our construction relies on the existence of a base
group G0 in which the κ-SDDH assumption holds—this states that, given a (κ +1)-tuple
of G0-elements (g, g
ω, . . . , gω
κ
), we cannot efficiently distinguish gω
κ+1
from a random
element of G0. Under this assumption, we prove that the κ-MDDH problem, a natural
analogue of the DDH problem as stated below, is hard.
(The κ-MDDH problem, informal) Given a generator g1 of G1 and κ + 1
group elements g
ai
1 in G with ai←$ ZN , distinguish e(g1, . . . , g1)
∏κ+1
i=1 ai from
a random element of GT .
This problem can be used as the basis for several cryptographic constructions [7], includ-
ing by now the classic example of multiparty non-interactive key exchange (NIKE) [23].
Our other construction is for the asymmetric setting; that is, for multilinear maps
e : G1 ×· · ·×Gκ −→ GT for a collection of κ groups Gi and GT all of prime order N .
It uses a base group G0 in which we require only that the 1-SDDH assumption holds.
For this construction, we show that a natural asymmetric analogue of the κ-MDDH
assumption holds.
At a high level, then, our constructions are able to “bootstrap” from rather mild assump-
tions in a standard cryptographic group to much stronger multilinear assumptions in a
group (or groups, in the asymmetric setting) equipped with a κ-linear map. Here, κ is
fixed up-front at the time of setup, but is otherwise unrestricted. Of course, such con-
structions cannot be expected to come “for free,” and we need to make use of powerful
tools including probabilistic IO (PIO) for obfuscating randomized circuits [17], dual-
mode NIZK proofs enjoying perfect soundness (for a binding CRS), perfect witness-
indistinguishability (for a hiding CRS), and perfect zero knowledge, and additive homo-
morphic encryption for the group (ZN ,+) (or alternatively, a perfectly correct FHE
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scheme). We note that all these tools can be constructed from a (pair of) pairing-friendly
groups (in which, e.g., the SXDH assumption holds), subexponentially secure one-way
functions, and subexponentially secure IO. It is an important open problem arising from
our work to weaken the requirements on, or remove altogether, these additional tools.
1.2. General Approach
Our approach to obtaining multilinear maps in the symmetric setting is as follows (with
many details to follow in the main body).1 Let G0 with generator g0 be a group of prime
order N in which the κ-SDDH assumption holds.






x1 where gω0 comes from a κ-SDDH instance; we write x = (x0, x1) for
the vector of exponents representing h. Then, G1 consists of all strings of the form
(h, c1, c2, π) where h ∈ G0, ciphertext c1 is a homomorphic encryption under public
key pk1 of a vector x representing h, ciphertext c2 is a homomorphic encryption under
a second public key pk2 of another vector y also representing h, and π is a NIZK
proof showing consistency of the two vectors x and y, i.e., a proof that the plaintexts
x, y underlying c1, c2 encode the same group element h. Note that each element of the
base group G0 is multiply represented when forming elements in G1, but that equality of
group elements in G1 is easy to test. An alternative viewpoint is to consider (c1, c2, π) as
being auxiliary information accompanying element h ∈ G0; we prefer the perspective of
redundant encodings, and our abstraction in Sect. 3 is stated in such terms. When viewed
in this way, our approach can be seen as closely related to the Naor–Yung paradigm for
constructing CCA-secure PKE [37].
Addition of two elements in G1 is carried out by an obfuscation of a circuit CAdd
that is published along with the groups. It has the secret keys sk1, sk2 hard-coded in; it
first checks the respective proofs, then uses the additive homomorphic property of the
encryption scheme to combine ciphertexts, and finally uses the secret keys sk1, sk2 as
witnesses to generate a new NIZK proof showing equality of encodings. Note that the
new encoding is as compact as that of the two input elements.
The multilinear map on inputs (hi , ci,1, ci,2, πi ) for 1 ≤ i ≤ κ is computed using
the obfuscation of a circuit CMap that has sk1 and ω hard-coded in. This allows CMap to




0 . This is defined to be the output of our multilinear map e,
and so our target group GT is in fact G0, the base group. The multilinearity of e follows
immediately from the form of the exponent.
In the asymmetric case, the main difference is that we work with different values ωi
in each of our input groups Gi . However, the groups are all constructed via redundant
encodings, just as above.
This provides a high-level view of our approach, but no insight into why the approach
achieves our aim of building multilinear maps with associated hard problems. Let us
give some intuition on why the κ-MDDH problem is hard in our setting. We transform
1This version fixes a flaw that we found in the proof of Theorem 1 in the conference version of the paper.
The construction of Sect. 4 has been slightly modified, but it does not make use of stronger assumptions and
has comparable efficiency.
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T ), where d is the product of the ai ∈ ZN , g1 is
in the “encoded” form above, and thus, g1 = (h1, c1, c2, π), and gT is a generator of
GT = G0, into another κ-MDDH tuple h
′ with exponents a′i = ai +ω for i ≤ κ+1. This
means that the exponent of the challenge element in the target group d ′ =
∏κ+1
i=1 (ai +ω)
can be seen as a degree κ + 1 polynomial in ω. Therefore, with the knowledge of the ai
and a κ-SDDH challenge, with ω implicit in the exponent, we are able to switch gd
′
T to
a uniformly random value.
Nevertheless, in the preceding simplistic argument, we have made two assumptions.
The first is that we are able to provide an obfuscation of a circuit C ′Map that has the same
functionality as CMap over G1 without the explicit knowledge of ω. We resolve this by
showing a way of evaluating the κ-linear map on any elements of G1 using only the
powers gω
i
0 for 1 ≤ i ≤ κ , and vectors extracted from the accompanying ciphertexts,
and then applying IO to the two circuits.2
The second assumption we made is that we can indeed switch from h to h′ without
being noticed. In other words, that the vectors xi , yi representing g
ai can be replaced
(without being noticed) with vectors h′i whose second coordinate is always fixed. Intu-
itively, this is based on the IND-CPA security of the FHE scheme, but in order to give
a successful reduction, we also have to change the circuit CAdd (since CAdd uses both
decryption keys) and apply probabilistic indistinguishability obfuscation [17] to the
circuit.
We note that in this work, we do not construct graded encoding schemes as in [23]. That
is, we do not construct maps from Gi ×G j to Gi+ j . On the other hand, our construction
is noiseless and is closer to multilinear maps as defined by Boneh and Silverberg [7].
1.3. The Current State of Multilinear Maps Constructions
Multilinear maps have been in a state of turmoil, with the discovery of attacks [9,13,14,
30,36] against the GGH13 [23], CLT [15], and GGH15 [26] proposals, and a sequence
of countermeasures and fixes [12,16], which since have been broken, too. Hence, our
confidence in constructions for graded encoding schemes (and thereby multilinear maps)
has been shaken. On the other hand, recently, several constructions of IO from increas-
ingly weaker assumptions have been proposed (see, for example, [1,3,24,33–35,45]),
culminating in the construction [35] that requires only trilinear (non-graded) multilinear
maps.
Hence, currently it is perhaps more plausible to assume that IO exists than it is to
assume that secure (multi-level) multilinear maps exist. However, we stress that more
cryptanalysis of IO constructions is required to investigate what security they provide.
Moreover, even though current constructions for IO rely on graded encoding schemes,
it is not implausible that alternative routes to achieving IO without relying on multilinear
maps will emerge in due course. Furthermore, multilinear maps, and more generally
graded encoding schemes, have proven to be very fruitful as constructive tools in their
own right (cf. [7,40], resp., [5,8,22,25,27,31,42]). This rich set of applications coupled
with the current uncertainty over the status of graded encoding schemes and multilinear
2This is not trivial since the new method should not lead to an exponential blowup in κ .
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maps provides additional motivation to ask what additional tools are needed in order
to upgrade IO to multilinear maps. As an additional benefit, we upgrade (via IO) noisy
graded encoding schemes to clean multilinear maps—sometimes now informally called
“dream” or “ideal” multilinear maps.
1.4. Related Work
The work that is technically closest to ours is that of Yamakawa et al. (see [43,44]);
indeed, their work was the starting point for ours. Yamakawa et al. construct a self-pairing
map, that is, a bilinear map from G×G to G; multilinear maps can be obtained by iterating
their self-pairing. Their work is limited to the RSA setting. It uses the group of signed
quadratic residues modulo a Blum integer N , denoted QR+N , to define a pairing function
that, on input elements gx , gy in QR+N , outputs g
2xy . In their construction, elements of
QR+N are augmented with auxiliary information to enable the pairing computation—in
fact, the auxiliary information for an element gx is simply an obfuscation of a circuit for
computing the 2x th power modulo ord(QR+N ), and the pairing is computed by evaluating
this circuit on an input gy (say). The main contribution of [43] is in showing that these
obfuscated circuits leak nothing about x or the group order.
A nice feature of their scheme is that the degree of linearity κ that can be accommo-
dated is not limited up-front in the sense that the pairing output is also a group element
to which further pairing operations (derived from auxiliary information for other group
elements) can be applied. However, the construction has several drawbacks. First, the
element output by the pairing does not come with auxiliary information.3 Second, the
size of the auxiliary information for a product of group elements grows exponentially
with the length of the product, as each single product involves computing the obfusca-
tion of a circuit for multiplying, with its inputs already being obfuscated circuits. Third,
the main construction in [43] only builds hard problems for the self-pairing of the com-
putational type. (In fact, they show the hardness of the computational version of the
κ-MDDH problem in QR+N assuming that factoring is hard.) Still, this is sufficient for
several cryptographic applications.
In contrast, our construction is generic with respect to its platform group. Further-
more, the equivalent of the auxiliary information in our approach does not itself involve
any obfuscation. Consequently, the description of a product of group elements stays
compact. Indeed, given perfect additive homomorphic encryption for (Zp,+), we can
perform arbitrary numbers of group operations in each component group Gi . It is an
open problem to find a means of augmenting our construction with the equivalent of
auxiliary information in the target group GT , to make our multilinear maps amenable
to iteration and thereby achieve graded maps as per [15,23].
3The authors of [43] state that such information can be added in their construction, but what would be
needed is the obfuscation of a circuit for computing 4xyth powers. The information available for building this
would be obfuscations of circuits for computing 2x th and 2yth powers, so an obfuscation of a composition of
already obfuscated circuits would be required. Strictly speaking then, the auxiliary information associated with
elements output by their pairing is of a different type to that belonging to the inputs, making it questionable
whether “self-pairing” is the right description of what is constructed in [43].
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Another related work is the work of Paneth and Sahai [39]. They show a near equiv-
alence between a suitable abstraction of multilinear maps and IO. Their result requires
no computational assumptions at all, but also does not consider multilinear maps in our
sense. In particular, they construct an abstraction of a multilinear map that only admits
restricted access to encodings, similar to the one in [24]. Beyond the group operation
and the multilinear map, other procedures for, e.g., uniform sampling, comparison or
rerandomization of encodings are not part of this abstraction. Our notion of a multilin-
ear map, on the other hand, contains descriptions of efficient procedures for all of these
tasks.
1.5. Follow-Up Work
The work [21] extends our approach from this work to graded encoding schemes (with
multilinear maps). They use techniques similar to ours and in particular employ a suitable
“switching theorem” (like our Theorem 1) to replace encodings of equivalent group
elements.
On the other hand, the work [2] aims to construct groups (or, rather, encoding schemes)
that support stronger computational assumptions. Specifically, [2] construct encoding
schemes in which even an adaptive variant of the so-called Uber assumption [6] holds.
The price that [2] pay is that their encoding scheme has no extraction algorithm (i.e., no
algorithm that takes an encoding and outputs a bit string that is unique for the encoded
group element). Not only such an extraction algorithm is useful to compare elements,
it can also be used to transform non-unique group elements to a unique common secret
in a Diffie–Hellman key exchange protocol. Observe that with non-unique group ele-
ments and without such an extraction algorithm, the two parties may end with different
representations of the same shared key.
In this setting, the only means to compare two group elements (given by possibly
different encodings) is an explicit comparison algorithm that takes two encodings as
input and outputs whether these encodings represent the same group element. ([2] provide
such a comparison algorithm.) The techniques that [2] use are again an extension of our
techniques.
1.6. Relation to Conference Version of This Work
Erratum. After the publication of the conference version of this work at TCC 2016-A,
we became aware of several technical problems in our work. Specifically, the conference
version of our work (and of course a previous full version) claimed (a) the validity of
the RANK assumption (a reformulation of the Un-matrix Diffie–Hellman assumption
from [19]) in our framework and (b) a variant of our construction that only uses indistin-
guishability obfuscation (instead of probabilistic indistinguishability obfuscation). We
encountered serious problems in both respective proofs, and we are currently not aware
of a way to repair these proofs.
Furthermore, we became aware of problems in the proof of the multilinear DDH
assumption in our framework (both in the symmetric and asymmetric settings). These
problems can be resolved, which in fact leads to a simpler proof from a slightly stronger
computational assumption.
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Hence, this version of our work omits the results (a) and (b) described above and
provides corrected versions of the proofs of the MDDH assumption in our framework.
Changes to conference version. Besides the corrections explained above, this version
features full proofs, and in particular a detailed and modular treatment of the central
switching theorem (Theorem 1). Our constructed group has non-unique, randomized
encodings in place of group elements, and Theorem 1 allows to replace one encoding
with another encoding, as long as both encodings are functionally equivalent.
2. Preliminaries
2.1. Notation
We denote the security parameter by λ ∈ N and assume that it is implicitly given to all
algorithms in the unary representation 1λ. By an algorithm, we mean a stateless Turing
machine. Algorithms are randomized unless stated otherwise, and ppt as usual stands for
“probabilistic polynomial-time” in the (unary) security parameter. Given a randomized
algorithm A, we denote the action of running A on input(s) (1λ, x1, . . .) with fresh
random coins r and assigning the output(s) to y1, . . . by (y1, . . .)←$ A(1
λ, x1, . . . ; r).
For a finite set X , we denote its cardinality by |X | and the action of sampling a uniformly
random element x from X by x←$ X . Vectors are written in boldface x and by slight
abuse of notation, running algorithms on vectors of elements indicates component-wise
operation. Throughout the paper, ⊥ denotes a special error symbol, and poly(·) stands for
a fixed polynomial. A real-valued function negl(λ) is negligible if negl(λ) ∈ O(λ−ω(1)).
We denote the set of all negligible functions by Negl and use negl(λ) to denote an
unspecified negligible function.
2.2. Homomorphic Public-Key Encryption
Circuits. A polynomial-sized deterministic circuit family C := {Cλ}λ∈N is a sequence
of sets of poly(λ)-sized circuits for a fixed polynomial poly. We assume that for all
λ ∈ N, all circuits C ∈ Cλ share a common input domain ({0, 1}
λ)a(λ), where a(λ)
is a the arity of the circuit family, and codomain {0, 1}λ. A randomized circuit family
is defined similarly except that the circuits now also take random coins r ∈ {0, 1}r(λ).
To make the coins used by a circuit explicit (e.g., to view a randomized circuit as a
deterministic one), we write C(x; r).
Syntax and compactness. A tuple of ppt algorithms  := (Gen, Enc, Dec, Eval) is
called a homomorphic public-key encryption (HPKE) scheme for deterministic circuit
family C = {Cλ}λ∈N of arity a(λ) if (Gen, Enc, Dec) is a conventional public-key
encryption scheme with message space {0, 1}λ and Eval is a deterministic algorithm
that on input, a public key pk, a circuit C ∈ Cλ and ciphertexts c1, . . . , ca(λ) output a
ciphertext c. We require HPKE schemes to be compact in the sense that the outputs of
Eval have a size that is bounded by a polynomial function of the security parameter (and
independent of the size of the circuit). Without loss of generality, we assume that secret
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keys of an HPKE scheme are the random coins used in key generation. This will allow
us to check key pairs for validity.
Correctness. We require the following perfect correctness requirements from a HPKE
scheme:
1. Scheme  := (Gen, Enc, Dec) is perfectly correct as a PKE scheme; that is, for
any λ ∈ N, any (sk, pk)←$ Gen(1λ), any m ∈ {0, 1}λ, and any c←$ Enc(m, pk),
we have that Dec(c, sk) = m.
2. We furthermore require that any ciphertext (i.e., not only honestly generated ones)
uniquely determines the message it decrypts to. That is, for any λ ∈ N, any pk
in the range of Gen(1λ), and any syntactically possible c, there is precisely one
m (which may be m = ⊥), such that for all sk with (pk, sk) = Gen(sk), we have
Dec(c, sk) = m.
3. The evaluation algorithm is also perfectly correct in the sense that for any λ ∈ N,
any (sk, pk)←$ Gen(1λ), any mi ∈ {0, 1}
λ for i ∈ [a(λ)], any ci←$ Enc(mi , pk),
any C ∈ Cλ and any c ← Eval(pk, C, c1, . . . , ca(λ)), we have that Dec(c, sk) =
C(m1, . . . , ma(λ)).
We note that perfect correctness implies that every ciphertext (even an adversarially
generated one) uniquely determines its decryption result, independently of the used
secret key (for a given public key). Hence, it is reasonable to think of any ciphertext as
“containing” a uniquely defined message (as long as only secret keys consistent with a
given public key are used).
Security. The IND-CPA security of an HPKE scheme is defined identically to a standard
PKE scheme without reference to the Dec and Eval algorithms. Formally, we require








− 1 ∈ Negl ,
where game IND-CPAA(λ) is shown in Fig. 1 (left). Adversary A is legitimate if it
outputs two messages of equal lengths.
HPKE schemes can be constructed from rerandomizable IND-CPA secure PKE
schemes, subexponentially secure IO, and subexponentially secure one-way func-
tions [17]. The correctness properties of this construction immediately follow from
those of its underlying components. Although this HPKE construction may not be per-
fectly correct in our sense above, when used with ElGamal (which is rerandomizable
and IND-CPA secure under the DDH assumption), it does satisfy our notion of perfect
correctness.
2.3. Obfuscators
Syntax and correctness. A ppt algorithm Obf is called an obfuscator for (determin-
istic or randomized) circuit class C = {Cλ}λ∈N if Obf on input the security parameter 1
λ
and the description of a (deterministic or randomized) circuit C ∈ Cλ outputs a deter-
ministic circuit C . For deterministic circuits, we require Obf to be perfectly correct in
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Fig. 1. Left: IND-CPA security of a (homomorphic) PKE scheme. Middle: Indistinguishability security of an
obfuscator. Right: Static input (aka. selective) X -IND property of A := (A1, A2).
the sense the circuits C and C are functionally equivalent; that is, that for all λ ∈ N,
all C ∈ Cλ, all C←$ Obf(1
λ, C), and all mi ∈ {0, 1}
λ for i ∈ [a(λ)], we have that
C(m1, . . . , ma(λ)) = C(m1, . . . , ma(λ)). For randomized circuits, the authors of [17]
define correctness via computational indistinguishability of the outputs of C and C . For
our constructions, we do not rely on this property and instead require that C and C are
functionally equivalent up to a change in randomness; that is, for all λ ∈ N, all C ∈ Cλ,
all C←$ Obf(1λ, C) and all mi ∈ {0, 1}
λ for i ∈ [a(λ)], we require there is an r such
that C(m1, . . . , ma(λ)) = C(m1, . . . , ma(λ); r). In this paper by correctness, we refer to
this latter property. We note that the construction from [17] is correct as it relies on a
correct (indistinguishability) obfuscator (and a PRF to internally generate the required
random coins).
Security. The security of an obfuscator Obf requires that for any legitimate ppt adver-
sary A := (A1,A2)




− 1 ∈ Negl ,
where game IND is shown in Fig. 1 (middle). Depending on the notion of legitimacy
different security notions for the obfuscator emerge, we consider two such notions below.
Functionally equivalent samplers. We call (the first phase of) A a functionally






C0(x) 	= C1(x) : (C0, C1, st)←$ A1(1
λ); x←$ D(C0, C1, st)
]
∈ Negl.
The security notion associated with equivalent samplers is called indistinguishability. We
call an obfuscator meeting this level of security an indistinguishability obfuscator [24]
and use IO instead of Obf to emphasize this.
X -IND samplers [17] Roughly speaking, A is an X -IND sampler if there is a set X of
size at most X such that the circuits output by A are functionally equivalent outside X
and furthermore within X the outputs of the two sampled circuits are indistinguishable.
Formally, let X (·) be a function such that X (λ) ≤ 2λ for all λ ∈ N. We call A an X -IND
sampler if there is a set Xλ of size at most X (λ) such that the following two conditions
hold: (1) for all (possibly unbounded) D, the advantage function below is negligible




(λ) := Pr [C0(x; r) 	= C1(x; r) ∧ x /∈ Xλ :
(C0, C1, st)←$ A(1
λ); (x, r)←$ D(C0, C1, st)
]
.
(2) For all non-uniform ppt distinguishers D := (D1,D2)
X (λ) · Advsel-ind









(1λ) is shown in Fig. 1 (right). This game has a static (or selective)
flavor as D1 chooses a differing input x before it gets to see the challenge circuit pair.
We call an obfuscator meeting this level of security a probabilistic indistinguishability
obfuscator [17] and use PIO instead of Obf to emphasize this.
[17] show how to construct secure probabilistic indistinguishability obfuscators for
X -IND samplers from subexponentially secure indistinguishability obfuscation and
subexponentially secure one-way functions.
2.4. Dual-Mode NIZK Proof Systems
In our constructions, we will be relying on special types of non-interactive zero-
knowledge proof systems [29]. These systems have “dual-mode” common reference
string (CRS) generation algorithms that produce indistinguishable CRSs in the “binding”
and “hiding” modes. They also enjoy perfect completeness in both modes, are perfectly
sound and extractable in the binding mode, and perfectly witness-indistinguishable (WI)
and zero knowledge (ZK) in the hiding mode. The standard prototype for such schemes
is pairing-based Groth–Sahai proofs [29]. These proof systems can be instantiated in any
(pair of) pairing-friendly groups, under a variety of computational assumptions, includ-
ing the SXDH and k-Linear assumptions. Moreover, using a generic NP reduction to the
satisfiability of (systems of) quadratic equations, we can obtain a suitable proof system
for any NP language.4 We formalize the syntax and security of such proof systems next.
Syntax. A relation with setup is a pair of ppt algorithms (S, R) such that S(1λ) outputs
(gpk, gsk) and R(gpk, x, w) is a ternary relation that outputs a bit b ∈ {0, 1}. A dual-
mode non-interactive zero-knowledge (NIZK) proof system  for (S, R) consists of six
algorithms as follows. (1) Algorithm BCRS(gpk, gsk) outputs a (binding) common ref-
erence string crs and an extraction trapdoor tdext ; (2) HCRS(gpk, gsk) outputs a (hiding)
common reference string crs and a simulation trapdoor tdzk ; (3) Prove(gpk, crs, x, w) on
input crs, an instance x , and a witness w, outputs a proof π ; (4) Verify(gpk, crs, x, π)
on input a bit string crs, an instance x , and a proof π , outputs accept or reject; (5)
WExt(tdext , x, π) on input an extraction trapdoor, an instance x , and a proof π , outputs
a witness w; and (6) Sim(tdzk, crs, x) on input the simulation trapdoor tdzk , the CRS
crs, and an instance x , outputs a simulated proof π . We require a dual-mode NIZK to
meet the following requirements.
4We note that extraction in Groth–Sahai proofs does not recover a witness for all types of statements.
(Instead, for some types of statements, only gwi for a witness variable wi ∈ Zp can be recovered.) Here,
however, we will only be interested in witnesses w = (w1, . . . , wn) ∈ {0, 1}
n that are bit strings, in which
case extraction always recovers w. (Specifically, extraction will recover gwi for all i and thus all wi .)
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CRS indistinguishability. The common reference strings generated through BCRS
(gpk, gsk) and HCRS(gpk, gsk) are computationally indistinguishable. We denote the




Perfect completeness under BCRS/HCRS. For any λ ∈ N, any (gpk, gsk)←$ S(1λ),
any crs←$ BCRS(gpk, gsk), any (x, w) such that R(gpk, x, w) = 1, and any
π←$ Prove(gpk, crs, x, w), we have that Verify(gpk, crs, x, π) = 1. We require this
property to also hold for any choice of crs←$ HCRS(gpk, gsk).
Perfect soundness under BCRS. For any λ ∈ N, any (gpk, gsk)←$ S(1λ), any com-
mon reference string crs←$ BCRS(gpk, gsk), any x for which for all w ∈ {0, 1}∗, we
have R(gpk, x, w) = 0, and any π ∈ {0, 1}∗, we have that Verify(gpk, crs, x, π) = 0.
Perfect extractability under BCRS. For any λ ∈ N, any (gpk, gsk)←$ S(1λ), any
(crs, tdext )←$ BCRS(gpk, gsk), any tuple (x, π) with Verify(gpk, crs, x, π) = 1, and
for w←$ WExt(tdext , x, π), we always have R(gpk, x, w) = 1.
Perfect WI under HCRS. For any λ ∈ N, any (gpk, gsk)←$ S(1λ), any (crs, tdzk)←$
HCRS(gpk, gsk), any (x, wb) such that R(gpk, x, wb) = 1 for b ∈ {0, 1}, we have that
πb←$ Prove(gpk, crs, x, wb) for b ∈ {0, 1} are identically distributed.
Perfect ZK under HCRS. For any λ ∈ N, any (gpk, gsk)←$ S(1λ), any (crs, tdzk)←$
HCRS(gpk, gsk), any (x, w) such that R(gpk, x, w) = 1, it is that π0←$ Prove(gpk,
crs, x, w) and π1←$ Sim(tdzk, x) are identically distributed.
2.5. Hard Membership Problems
Finally, we will use languages with hard membership problems. Let U = {Uλ} be a col-
lection of universal sets, and let L = {Lλ} be a collection of sets Lλ = {L} of languages
with L ⊆ Uλ for each L ∈ Lλ. We say that L has a hard subset membership problem if
the following holds: No ppt algorithm given L←$ Lλ can efficiently distinguish between
x←$ L and x←$ Uλ.
3. Multilinear Groups with Non-Unique Encodings
Before presenting our constructions, we formally introduce what we mean by a mul-
tilinear group (MLG) scheme. Our abstraction differs from that of Garg, Gentry, and
Halevi [23] in that our treatment of MLG schemes is a direct adaptation of the “dream”
MLG setting (called the “cryptographic” MLG setting in [7]) to a setting where group
elements have non-unique encodings (as in [23]). In our abstraction, on top of the proce-
dures needed for generating, manipulating, and checking group elements, we introduce
an equality procedure which generalizes the equality relation for groups with unique
encodings.
Syntax. A multilinear group (MLG) scheme Γ consists of six ppt algorithms as follows.
Setup(1λ, 1κ ): This is the setup algorithm. On input the security parameter 1λ
and the multilinearity 1κ , it outputs the group parameters pp. These parame-
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ters include generators g1, . . . , gκ+1, identity elements 11, . . . , 1κ+1, and integers
N1, . . . , Nκ+1, which will represent group orders. Generators, identity elements,
and group orders are discussed in detail below. In our constructions, we will have
N1, . . . , Nκ+1 all equal to some prime N , but we work here at a greater level of
generality because it may be useful in future work. We assume pp is provided to
the various algorithms below.
Vali (h): This is the validity testing algorithm. On input (the group parameters), a
group index 1 ≤ i ≤ κ + 1 and a string h ∈ {0, 1}∗, it returns b ∈ {0, 1}. We define
Gi , which is also parameterized by pp, as the set of all h for which Vali (h) = 1.
We write h ∈ Gi when Vali (h) = 1 and refer to such strings as group elements
(since we will soon impose a group structure on Gi ). Without loss of generality,
we assume the Gi to be non-intersecting sets (since a string h ∈ Gi can always be
augmented with an encoding of i). We require that the bit strings in Gi have lengths
that are polynomial in λ and κ , a property that we refer to as compactness.
Eqi (h1, h2): This is the equality algorithm. On input two valid group elements
h1, h2 ∈ Gi , it outputs a bit b ∈ {0, 1}. We require Eqi to define an equivalence
relation. We say that the group has unique encodings if Eqi simply checks the equal-
ity of bit strings. We write Gi (h) for the set of all h
′ ∈ Gi such that Eqi (h, h
′) = 1;
for any such h, h′ in Gi , we write h = h
′; sometimes we write h = h′ in Gi for
clarity. Since “=” refers to equality of bit strings as well as equivalence under Eqi ,
we will henceforth write “as bit strings” when we mean equality in that sense. We
require |Gi/Eqi |, the number of equivalence classes into which Eqi partitions Gi ,
to be finite and equal to Ni (where Ni comes from pp). We assume throughout the
paper that various algorithms below return ⊥ when run on invalid group elements.
Opi (h1, h2): This algorithm defines the group operation. On input two valid group
elements h1, h2 ∈ Gi , it outputs h ∈ Gi . We write h1h2 in place of Opi (h1, h2) for
simplicity. We require that Opi respect the equivalence relations Eqi , meaning that if
h1 = h2 in Gi and h ∈ Gi , then h1h = h2h in Gi . We also demand that h1h2 = h2h1
in Gi (commutativity); for any third h3 ∈ Gi , we require h1(h2h3) = (h1h2)h3 in
Gi (associativity), and we require h1i = h in Gi for all h ∈ Gi .
The algorithm Opi gives rise to an exponentiation algorithm Expi (h, z) that on input
h ∈ Gi and z ∈ N outputs an h
′ ∈ Gi such that h
′ = h · · · h in Gi with z occurrences
of h. When no h is specified, we assume h = gi . This algorithm runs in polynomial
time in the length of z. We denote Expi (h, z) by h
z and define h0 := 1i . Note that
under the definition of Ni for any h ∈ Gi we have that Expi (h, Ni ) = 1i . This in
turn leads to an inversion algorithm Invi (h) that on input h ∈ Gi outputs h
Ni −1.
We insist that gi in fact has order Ni , so that (the equivalence class containing) gi
generates Gi/Eqi .
The above requirements ensure that Gi/Eqi acts as a cyclic group of order Ni
with respect to the operation induced by Opi , with identity (the equivalence class
containing) 1i , and inverse operation Invi .
We use the bracket notion [19] to denote an element h = gxi in Gi with [x]i .
When using this notation, we will write the group law additively. This notation will
be convenient in the construction and analysis of our MLG schemes. For example,
[z]i +[z
′]i succinctly denotes Opi (Exp(gi , z), Exp(gi , z
′)). Note that when writing
[z]i , it is not necessarily the case that z is explicitly known.
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e(h1, . . . , hκ): This is the multilinear map algorithm. For κ group elements hi ∈ Gi
as input, it outputs hκ+1 ∈ Gκ+1. We demand that for any 1 ≤ j ≤ κ and any
h′j ∈ G j
e(h1, . . . , h j h
′
j , . . . , hκ ) = e(h1, . . . , h j , . . . , hκ )e(h1, . . . , h
′
j , . . . , hκ ) in Gκ+1.
We also require the map to be non-degenerate in the sense that for some tuple
of elements as input the multilinear map outputs an element of Gκ+1 outside the
equivalence class of 1κ+1. We call an MLG scheme symmetric if the group algo-
rithms are independent of the group index for 1 ≤ i ≤ κ and e is invariant under
permutations of its inputs. That is, for any permutation π : [κ] −→ [κ], we have
e(h1, . . . , hκ) = e(hπ(1), . . . , hπ(κ)) in Gκ+1 .
We refer to all the other cases as being asymmetric. To distinguish the target group,
we frequently write GT instead of Gκ+1 (and similarly for 1T and gT in place of
1κ+1 and gκ+1) as its structure in our construction will be different from that of the
source groups G1, . . . , Gκ .
Sami (z): This is the sampling algorithm. On input z ∈ N, it outputs some h ∈ Gi .
We also allow a special input ε to this algorithm, in which case the sampler is
required to output some h ∈ Gi together with a uniformly distributed z such that
h ∈ Gi (g
z
i ). Note that for groups with unique encodings, these algorithms trivially
exist. For notational convenience, for a known a, we define [a]i to be an element
sampled via Sami (a).
Some applications also rely on the following algorithm which provides a canonical
bit string for the group elements within a single equivalence class.
Exti (h): This is the extraction algorithm. On input h ∈ Gi , it outputs a string
s ∈ {0, 1}poly(λ). We demand that for any h1, h2 ∈ Gi with h1 = h2 in Gi , we have
that Exti (h1) = Exti (h2) (as bit strings). We also require that for [z]i←$ Sami (ε),
the distribution of Exti ([z]i ) is uniform over {0, 1}
poly(λ). For groups with unique
encodings, this algorithm trivially exists.
Comparison with GGH. Our formalization differs from that of [23] which defines a
graded encoding scheme. The main difference is that a graded encoding scheme defines
bilinear maps ei, j : Gi × G j −→ Gi+ j . Using this algorithm, one can implement Eqi
for any 1 ≤ i ≤ κ from Eqκ+1 as follows (if ei, j is injective). To check the equality of
h1, h2 ∈ Gi , call ei,κ+1−i (h, gκ+1−i ) for h = h1, h2 to map these elements to the target
group and check equality there using Eqκ+1. Similarly, Exti (h) can be constructed from
Extκ+1(h) and 1 j for all G j . (Note that for extraction we need a canonical string rather
than a canonical group element.) Moreover, the abstraction and construction of graded
encodings schemes in [23] do not provide any validity algorithms; these are useful in
certain adversarial situations such as CCA security and signature verification. Further, all
known candidate constructions of graded encoding schemes are noisy and only permit a
limited number of group operations (though parameters can be set to allow that number
to be polynomial). Finally, the known candidate graded encoding schemes do not permit
sampling for specific values of z, but rather only permit sampling elements with a z that
is only known up to its equivalence class.
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Syntactic extensions. Although our syntax does not treat the cases of graded [15,23],
exponentially multilinear, or self-pairing [43] maps, it can be modified to capture these
variants. We briefly outline the required modifications. For graded maps, we require the
existence of a map that on input hi ∈ Gi for indices i = i1, . . . , iℓ with t :=
∑ℓ
i=1 i j ≤ κ
outputs a group element in Gt . This map is required to be multilinear in each component.
For exponential (aka. unbounded) linearity, we provide the linearity κ in its binary
representation to the Setup algorithm. We also include procedures for generator and
identity element generation. Proper self-pairing maps correspond to a setting where the
group algorithms are independent of the group index for 1 ≤ i ≤ κ + 1 (including
the target index κ + 1), and the group generators and identity elements are all identical.
Observe that a proper self-pairing would induce a graded encoding scheme of unbounded
linearity; recall from the introduction that the scheme of Yamakawa et al. [43] does not
meet this definition because of the growth in the size of its auxiliary information.
4. The Construction
We now present our construction of an MLG scheme Γ according to the syntax intro-
duced in Sect. 3. In the later sections, we will consider special cases of the construction
and prove the hardness of analogues of the multilinear DDH problem under various
assumptions.
We rely on the following building blocks in our MLG scheme. (1) A cyclic group
G0 of some order N0 with generator g0 and identity 10; formally, we think of this as
a 1-linear MLG scheme Γ0 with unique encodings in which e is trivial; the algorithm
Val0 implies that elements of G0 are efficiently recognizable. (2) A general-purpose
obfuscator Obf. (3) A perfectly correct additively homomorphic public-key encryption
scheme  := (Gen, Enc, Dec, Eval) with plaintext space ZN .
5 (4) A dual-mode NIZK
proof system. (5) A family T D of (families of) languages TD which has a hard subset
membership problem, and such that all TD have efficiently computable witness relations
with unique witnesses.6 (See Sect. 2 for more formal definitions.)
We reserve variables and algorithms with index 0 for the base scheme Γ0; we also
write N = N0. We require that the algorithms of Γ0 except for Setup0 and Sam0 are
deterministic. We will also use the bracket notation to denote the group elements in G0.
For example, we write [z]0, [z
′]0 ∈ G0 for two valid elements of the base group and
[z]0 + [z
′]0 ∈ G0 for Op0([z]0, [z
′]0). Variables with nonzero indices correspond to
various source and target groups. Given all of the above components, our MLG scheme
Γ consists of algorithms as detailed in the sections that follow.
4.1. Setup
The setup algorithm for Γ samples parameters pp0←$ Setup0(1
λ) for the base MLG
scheme generates two encryption key pairs (pk j , sk j )←$ Gen(1
λ) ( j = 1, 2) of an
5Note that such a scheme can be constructed from any perfectly correct HPKE scheme.
6An example of such a language is the Diffie–Hellman language TD = {(gr1, g
r
2) | r ∈ N} in a DDH
group with generators g1, g2. In particular, a suitable trapdoor language imposes no additional computational
assumption in our upcoming security proof.
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HPKE scheme, and a matrix W = (ω1, . . . ,ωκ)
t ∈ Zκ×ℓN where κ is the linearity and
ℓ = 2 is a parameter of our construction. Although many of the upcoming results hold
for more general distributions of W, for concreteness, we set ωi = (1, ω) for all i and a
uniformly random ω. The setup algorithm then sets
gpk := (pp0, pk1, pk2, [W]0, TD, y) ,
where [W]0 denotes a matrix of G0 elements that entrywise is written in the bracket
notation, TD←$ T D, and y is not in TD. In our MLG scheme, we set N1 = · · · =
Nκ+1 := N , where N is the group order implicit in pp0. The setup algorithm then
generates a common reference string crs = (crs′, y) where crs′←$ BCRS(gpk, gsk)
for a relation (S, R) that will be defined in Sect. 4.2. It also constructs two obfuscated
circuits CMap and CAdd which we will describe in Sects. 4.3 and 4.4. For 1 ≤ i ≤ κ , the
identity elements 1i and group generators gi are sampled using Sami (0) and Sami (xi ),
respectively, for algorithm Sami described in Sect. 4.5 with xi ∈ [N −1]. We emphasize
that this approach is well defined since the operation of Sami is defined independently
of the generators and the identity elements and depends only on gpk and crs. We set
1κ+1 = 10 and gκ+1 = g0. The scheme parameters are
pp := (gpk, crs, CMap, CAdd, g1, . . . , gκ+1, 11, . . . , 1κ+1) .
We note that this algorithm runs in polynomial time in λ as long as κ is polynomial in λ.
4.2. Validity and Equality
The elements of Gi for 1 ≤ i ≤ κ are tuples of the form h = ([z]0, c1, c2, π) where c1, c2
are encryptions of vectors from ZℓN under pk1, pk2, respectively (encryption algorithm
Enc extends from plaintext space ZN to Z
ℓ
N in the obvious way) and where π is a NIZK
to be defined below. We refer to (c1, c2, π) as the auxiliary information for [z]0. The
elements of Gκ+1 are just those of G0.
The NIZK proof system that we use corresponds to the following inclusive disjunctive
relation (S, R := R1 ∨ R2). Algorithm S(1
λ) outputs gpk = (pp0, pk1, pk2, [W]0, TD)
as defined above and sets gsk = (sk1, sk2). Relation R1 on input gpk, tuple ([z]0, c1, c2),
and witness (x, y, r1, r2, sk1, sk2) accepts iff [z]0 ∈ G0, the representations of [z]0 as
x, y ∈ ZℓN are valid with respect to [W]0 in the sense that
[z]0 = [〈x,ωi 〉]0 ∧ [z]0 = [〈y,ωi 〉]0 ,
(where 〈·, ·〉 denotes inner product) and the following ciphertext validity condition (with
respect to the inputs to the relation) is met:
(c1 = Enc(x, pk1; r1) ∧ c2 = Enc(y, pk2; r2))
∨
(
(pk1, sk1) = Gen(sk1) ∧ (pk2, sk2) = Gen(sk2)
∧ x = Dec(c1, sk1) ∧ y = Dec(c2, sk2))
)
(1)
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Recall that we have assumed the secret key of the encryption scheme to be the ran-
dom coins used in Gen. Note that the representation validity check can be efficiently
performed “in the exponent” using [W]0 and the explicit knowledge of x and y. Note also
that for honestly generated keys and ciphertexts, the two checks in the expression above
are equivalent (although this is not generally the case when public keys are malformed,
i.e., not in the range of Gen).
Intuitively, the upper branch of the disjunction (1) checks consistency based on encryp-
tion randomness. This branch allows Sam to generate proofs without decryption keys.
The lower branch of (1) uses decryption keys. This branch is used by the addition circuit
Add to generate proofs without knowing the encryption randomness.
Relation R2 depends on the language TD, and on input gpk, tuple ([z]0, c1, c2), and
witness wy accepts iff wy is a valid witness to y ∈ TD. (Note that R2 completely
ignores ([z]0, c1, c2).) Intuitively, R2 creates a simulation trapdoor (i.e., wy) that allows
to generate proofs for statements that are not in R1.
For 1 ≤ i ≤ κ , the Vali algorithm for Γ , on input ([z]0, c1, c2, π), first checks that
the first component is in G0 using Val0 and then checks the proof π ; if both tests pass,
it then returns ⊤, else ⊥. Observe that for an honest choice of crs = (crs′, y), the
perfect completeness and the perfect soundness of the proof system ensure that only
those elements which pass relation R1 are accepted. Algorithm Valκ+1 just uses Val0.
The equality algorithm Eqi of Γ for 1 ≤ i ≤ κ first checks the validity of the
two group elements passed to it and then returns true iff their first components match,
according to Eq0, the equality algorithm from the base scheme Γ0. Algorithm Eqκ+1
just uses Eq0. The correctness of this algorithm follows from the perfect completeness
of .
4.3. Group Operations







′) ∈ Gi , generates a tuple representing the product h · h
′. This, in par-
ticular, will enable our multilinear map to be run on the additions of group elements
whose explicit representations are not necessarily known. We exploit the structure of
the base group as well as the homomorphic properties of the encryption scheme to “add
together” the first three components. We then use (sk1, sk2) as a witness to generate a
proof π ′′ that the new tuple is well formed. (For technical reasons, we check the validity
of h and h′ in two different ways: using proofs π , π ′, and also explicitly using (sk1, sk2).
Note that, although useful in the analysis, the explicit check is redundant by the perfect
soundness of the proof system under a binding crs′.)
In pp, we include an obfuscation of the CAdd circuit shown in Fig. 2 (top), and again,
we emphasize that steps 5a or 5b are never reached with a binding crs′ (but they may be
reached with a hiding crs′ later in the analysis). Note that although we have assumed the
evaluation algorithm to be deterministic, algorithm Prove is randomized and we need
to address how we deal with its coins. To this end, we use a PIO to obfuscate CAdd; the
probabilistic obfuscator directly deals with the needed randomness.7 The Opi algorithm
7Typically, the obfuscated circuit will have a PRF key hardwired in and derives the required randomness
by applying the PRF to the circuit inputs.
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Fig. 2. Top: Circuit for addition of group elements. Explicit randomness r is internally generated when using a
PIO. Bottom: Circuit implementing the multilinear map. Recall that here gpk = (pp0, pk1, pk2, [W]0, TD, y).
for 1 ≤ i ≤ κ runs the obfuscated circuit on i , the input group elements. Algorithm
Opκ+1 just uses Op0 as usual. The correctness of this algorithm follows from those of
Γ0 and , the completeness of , and the correctness, in our sense, of the probabilistic
obfuscator Obf = PIO; see Sect. 2 for the definitions.
4.4. The Multilinear Map
The multilinear map for Γ , on input κ group elements hi = [zi ]i = ([zi ]0, ci,1, ci,2, πi ),
uses sk1 to recover the representation xi . It then uses the explicit knowledge of the matrix
W to compute the output of the map as








Recalling that Gκ+1 is nothing other than G0, and gκ+1 = g0, the output of the map
is just the G0-element (g0)
∏k
i=1〈xi ,ωi 〉. The product in the exponent can be efficiently
computed over ZN for any polynomial level of linearity κ and any ℓ as it uses xi and
ωi explicitly. The multilinearity of the map follows from the linearity of each of the
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multiplicands in the above product (and the completeness of , the correctness of ,
and the correctness of the (possibly probabilistic) obfuscator Obf). An obfuscation CMap
of the circuit implementing this operation (see Fig. 2, bottom) will be made available
through the public parameters, and e is defined to run this circuit on its inputs.
4.5. Sampling and Extraction
For sampling random group elements, we first define two vectors x and y in ZℓN satisfying
〈x,ωi 〉 = 〈y,ωi 〉. In other words, these vectors define two equivalent representations of
a group element relative to a matrix W. If W is explicitly known, the vectors x and y can
take arbitrary forms subject to validity. However, is only implicitly known by an honest
user of the system, and in order to sample random group elements, we set x = y = (z, 0)
for ℓ = 2. (We call these the canonical representations.)
Then, we set [z]0 := [〈y,ωi 〉]0 (which can be computed using [W]0 and explicit
knowledge of x) and
[z]i ←
(
[z]0, c1 = Enc(x, pk1; r1), c2 = Enc(y, pk2; r2),
π = Prove(gpk, crs, ([z]i , c1, c2), (x, y, r1, r2)
)
.
Note that the outputs of the sampler are not statistically uniform within Gi ([z]i ). Indeed,
not even the IND-CPA security of the encryption directly implies any form of security
of the generated ciphertexts (since the addition circuit Add contains the corresponding
decryption keys). Our upcoming “switching theorem” (Theorem 1) will, however, prove
that encodings that are functionally equivalent cannot be efficiently distinguished.
Since the target group has unique encodings, as noted in Sect. 3, an extraction algo-
rithm for all groups can be derived from one for the target group. The latter can be
implemented by applying a universal hash function to the group elements in GT , for
example.
5. Indistinguishability of Encodings
In this section, we will prove a theorem that is an essential tool in establishing the
intractability of the κ-MDDH for our MLG scheme Γ constructed in Sect. 4. This theo-
rem, roughly speaking, states that valid encodings of elements within a single equivalence
class are computationally indistinguishable. We formalize this property via the κ-Switch
game shown in Fig. 3. This game lets an adversary A choose an element [z]i ∈ Gi by
producing two valid representations (x0, y0) and (x1, y1) for it. The adversary is given
an encoding of [z]i generated using (xb, yb) for a random b and has to guess the bit b.
In this game, besides access to pp, which contains the obfuscated circuits for the group
operation and the multilinear map, we also provide the matrix W in the clear to the
adversary. This strengthens the κ-Switch game and is needed for our later analysis.
To prove that the advantage of A in the κ-Switch game is negligible, we rely on
the security of the obfuscator, the IND-CPA security of the encryption scheme, and the
security of the NIZK proof system.
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Fig. 3. Game formalizing the indistinguishability of encodings with an equivalence class. This game is specific
to our construction Γ . An adversary is legitimate if z = 〈xb, ωi 〉 = 〈yb, ωi 〉 for b ∈ {0, 1}. We note that A
gets explicit access to matrix W generated during setup .
Intuitively, the IND-CPA security of the encryption scheme will ensure that the encryp-
tions of the two representations are indistinguishable. This argument, however, does not
immediately work as the parameters pp contain component CAdd that depends on both
decryption keys. We deal with this by finding an alternative implementation of this cir-
cuit without the knowledge of the secret keys, in the presence of a slightly different
public parameters (which are computationally indistinguishable to those described in
Sect. 4). The next lemma, roughly speaking, says that provided parameters ppinclude an
instance y ∈ TD; then, there exists an alternative implementation ĈAdd that does not use
the secret keys, and whose obfuscation is indistinguishable to that of C̃Add of Fig. 2 (top)
for an adversary that knows the secret keys. It relies on the security of the obfuscator
and the security of the NIZK proof system.
Lemma 1. (CAdd without decryption keys) Let PIO be a secure obfuscator for X-IND
samplers and  be a dual-mode NIZK proof system. Additionally, let parameters p̃p be
sampled as in Sect. 4 but with ỹ ∈ TD. Furthermore, let p̂p be sampled as p̃p, but with a
hiding CRS ĉrs′, and an obfuscation of circuit ĈAdd of Fig. 4 (bottom). Then, for any ppt
adversary A, there are ppt adversaries B1 and B2 of essentially the same complexity as
A such that for all λ ∈ N
Pr [A(p̃p, sk1, sk2) = 1 : (sk1, sk2)←$ Gen(1
λ)]
− Pr [A(p̂p, sk1, sk2) = 1 : (sk1, sk2)←$ Gen(1
λ)]
≤ 2 · Advind
PIO,B1
(λ) + Advcrs,B2(λ).
Proof. The crucial observation is that a witness wy to ỹ ∈ TD is also a witness to
x ∈ R, and therefore, ĈAdd can use wy instead of sk1, sk2 to produce the output proof
π ′′. Below we provide descriptions of the transformation from CAdd to ĈAdd, and let Wi
denote the event that A in Gamei outputs 1.
Game0: We start with (a PIO obfuscation of) circuit CAdd of Fig. 2 and with p̃p including
ỹ ∈ TD and a binding crs′.
Game1: The circuit has witness wy to ỹ ∈ TD hard-coded. If some input reaches the
“invalid” branches, CAdd does not extract a witness from the corresponding
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proof, but instead uses wy to generate proof π
′′. [See Fig. 4 (top).] Note that
Game1 requires no extraction trapdoor tdext anymore.




By construction, the only difference between the games is that in Game1, proof
π ′′, with respect to invalid (input) encodings, is generated using hard-coded
witness wy to ỹ ∈ TD. Since wy is unique, and the CRS crs
′ guarantees perfect
soundness, this leads to identical behavior of CAdd in Game 0. Hence, this hop
is justified by PIO.
Game2: The CRS ĉrs
′ included in the public parameters is now hiding (such that the
generated proofs are perfectly witness-indistinguishable). We have that




where B2 is a ppt algorithm against the indistinguishability of binding and
hiding CRS’s.
Game3: ere, output proofs π
′′ for those inputs entering the “valid” branch (step 5b of
Fig. 4 (top)) use wy (and not sk1, sk2) as witness. In particular, this game does
not need to perform a explicit validity check (using sk1, sk2) anymore, and
therefore, the addition circuit can be described as in Fig. 4 (bottom).




By construction, the only difference between both games is that the public
parameters in Game2 contain a PIO obfuscation of CAdd and in Game3 contain
a PIO obfuscation of ĈAdd of Fig. 4. In Lemma 2, we prove that these circuit
variants are given by an X -IND sampler, and therefore, their PIO obfuscations
are indistinguishable. 
Lemma 2. (X-IND sampling) Let  be a dual-mode NIZK proof system for the relation
(S, R) defined in Sect. 4.2. Suppose  is perfectly witness-indistinguishable under a
hiding CRS. Let A be a sampler which outputs circuits (C̃Add, ĈAdd) of Fig. 4. (Both
circuits have the system parameters hard-coded in.) Then, A is X-IND for (the optimal)
X, the size of the domain of the circuits. More precisely, for any (possibly unbounded)




(λ) = 0 and Advsel-ind
A,D (λ) = 0 .
Proof. The first equality is immediate as X is set to be the entire domain of the circuits.
The second equality follows from the perfect witness-indistinguishability property of
the proof system. Indeed, the only difference between the two circuits is that, for those
inputs that are valid encodings, C̃Add uses decryption keys sk1, sk2 as witness to generate




2), (sk1, sk2); r), and ĈAdd uses
witness wy to ỹ ∈ TD (with ỹ in the public parameters) to generate the proof π̂
′′ ←




2), wy; r). The WI property with a hiding ĉrs
′ guarantees
that π ′′ and π̂ ′′ are identically distributed and hence so are the outputs of C̃Add and
ĈAdd. Note that no random coins are hardwired into these circuits—we are in the PIO
setting—and fresh coins are used to compute the circuits’ outputs.
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Fig. 4. Circuits for addition of group elements used in Lemma 1. p̂p includes gpk =
(pp0, pk1, pk2, [W]0, TD, ỹ) where ỹ ∈ TD (also includes a hiding CRS ĉrs
′). Both circuits also have hard-
coded (the) witness wy to ỹ ∈ TD. Top: sk1, sk2 are used to produce π
′′ on valid inputs. Bottom: wy is
always used to produce π ′′.
With Lemma 1, we can invoke IND-CPA security and via a sequence of games obtain
the result stated below. The proof can be found in “Appendix A.1”; we will give a
high-level overview of the proof below. (See also Fig. 5.)
Theorem 1. (Switching encodings using PIO) Let Γ be the MLG scheme constructed
in Sect. 4, where PIO is secure for X-IND samplers,  is an IND-CPA-secure encryption
scheme, and  is a dual-mode NIZK proof system. Then, encodings of equivalent group
elements are indistinguishable. More precisely, for any ppt adversary A and all λ ∈ N,
there are ppt adversaries B1, B2, B3, and B4 of essentially the same complexity as A
such that for all λ ∈ N
Adv
κ-switch
Γ,A (λ) ≤ 3 · Adv
sm
TD,B1
+ 7 · Advind
PIO,B2




Furthermore, B2 is an X-IND sampler for any function X (λ).
Proof sketch. The proof of this theorem proceeds via a sequence of 9 games as follows.
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Fig. 5. Outline of the proof steps of Theorem 1. b is the random bit of the κ-Switch game. (See Fig. 3.)
Changing between pp and p̃p is justified by the hardness of deciding membership of TD, and changing
between p̃p and p̂p by Lemma 1. The hops relying on PIO use the perfect correctness of , and the perfect
completeness and the perfect soundness of  under binding crs′ to argue function equivalence of CMap.
Game0: This is the κ-Switch game. The public parameters pp contain a no-instance
y /∈ TD, a binding crs′, and CAdd is constructed using (sk1, sk2) and CMap
using sk1. (See Fig. 2.) The ciphertexts c1 and c2 contain xb and yb for a
random bit b.
Game1: This game generates the public parameters p̃p so that they include a yes-instance
y ∈ TD. The difference to the previous game can be bounded via the hardness
of deciding membership in TD.
Game2: The public parameters p̂p change so that they include a hiding ĉrs
′, and a (PIO)
obfuscation of circuit ĈAdd, see Fig. 4. (Recall that this circuit uses the witness
wy to y ∈ TD to produce the output proofs π̃
′′, and therefore, the simultaneous
knowledge of decryption keys sk1,sk2 is not needed anymore.) Additionally,
the game uses wy to prepare the proof π in the κ-Switch challenge for A. By
Lemma 1 and the perfect witness-indistinguishability of , the difference with
the previous game can be bounded by PIO and CRS indistinguishability.
Game3: This game generates c2 by encrypting y1, even when b = 0. We can bound the
difference in any adversary’s success probability via the IND-CPA advantage
of  with respect to pk2. (The reduction will know (pk1, sk1) so as to be able
to construct CMap.)
Game4: The public parameters are changed back to p̃p, so that they include a binding
crs′, and a (PIO) obfuscation of circuit C̃Add of Fig. 2 (top). The difference
with the previous game is bounded again with Lemma 1.
Game5: Now, a no-instance y /∈ TD is included in the public parameters pp. This game
is justified by the hardness of deciding membership in TD.
Game6: This game uses sk2 (in place of sk1) in the generation of CMap circuit. In this
transition, we rely on the security of Obf , the perfect correctness of , and
the perfect soundness of . Perfect soundness of  implies that CMap rejects
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ciphertexts unless relation R1 holds. Together with the perfect correctness of
, R1 implies that CMap yields identical results with sk1 and sk2. We can then
use the IO security of Obf to justify the switch from using sk1 to using sk2.
(Note that for any function X , any obfuscator that is secure for X -IND samplers
is also secure as an indistinguishability obfuscator.) Note that in this game, it
is crucial that the crs′ is in the binding mode.
Game7: This game, similar to Game1, switches to public parameters p̃p with a yes-
instance y ∈ TD. The analysis is as before.
Game8: This game, similar to Game2, includes in p̂p a hiding ĉrs
′, and a (PIO) obfus-
cation of circuit ĈAdd. (See Fig. 4.) The analysis is as before.
Game9: This game generates c1 by encrypting x1, even when b = 0. The analysis is as
in Game3.
Observe that the challenge encoding in Game9 is independent of the random bit
b and the advantage of any (possibly unbounded) adversary A is 0. Collecting
bounds on the probabilities involved in the various game hops concludes the
proof.

6. The Multilinear DDH Problem
In this section, we show that natural multilinear analogues of the decisional Diffie–
Hellman (DDH) problem are hard for our MLG scheme Γ from Sect. 4. We will establish
this for two specific Setup algorithms which give rise to symmetric and asymmetric
multilinear maps in groups of prime order N . (See Sect. 3 for the formal definition.) In
the symmetric case, we will base hardness on the q-strong DDH problem [4] and in the
asymmetric case on the 1-strong DDH problem.
6.1. Intractable Problems
We start by formalizing the hard problems that we will be relying on and those whose
hardness we will be proving. We do this in a uniform way using the language of group
schemes of Sect. 3. Informally, the q-SDDH problem requires the indistinguishability
of gx
q+1
from a random element given (gx , gx
2
, . . . , gx
q
) for a random x , and the
κ-MDDH problem, whose hardness we will be establishing, generalizes the standard
bilinear DDH problem (and its variants) and requires this for g
a1···aκ+1
T in the presence
of (ga1, . . . , gaκ+1) (for uniformly random ai ).









− 1 ∈ Negl ,
where game q-SDDHAΓ0(λ) is shown in Fig. 6 (left).
The (κ, I )-MDDH problem. We use a slight reformulation of the (generalized) MDDH
problem from [23]. For κ ∈ N we say that an MLG scheme Γ is κ-MDDH intractable
with respect to the index set I if
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Fig. 6. Left: The strong DDH problem. Right: The multilinear DDH problem, where I specifies the available
group elements. By slight abuse of notation, repeated use of [ai ]i denotes the same sample. Recall that we




(λ) := 2 · Pr
[
(κ, I )-MDDHAΓ (λ)
]
− 1 ∈ Negl ,
where game (κ, I )-MDDHAΓ (λ) is shown in Fig. 6 (right). Here, I is a set of ordered
pairs of integers (i, j) with 1 ≤ i ≤ κ + 1, 1 ≤ j ≤ κ . The adversary is provided
with challenge group elements [ai ] j for (i, j) ∈ I , so that its challenge elements may
lie in any combination of the groups. The following example of such a set I leads to
a generalization of the symmetric external Diffie–Hellman (SXDH) assumption to the
multilinear case:
I = I ∗ := {(1, 1), . . . , (κ, κ), (κ + 1, κ)} .
Of course, when generalizing SXDH, the choice of the last element of I is not canonical.
Instead of (κ + 1, κ), also other values (κ + 1, j) for j ∈ {1, . . . , κ} seem natural.
6.2. The Symmetric Setting
We describe a special variant of our general construction in Sect. 4 which gives rise to
a symmetric MLG scheme as defined in Sect. 3.
We set ℓ := 2 and sample W = (ω1, . . . ,ωκ)
t by setting ωi = (1, ω) for a random
ω ∈ ZN . The generators and identity elements for all groups are set to be a single value
generated for the first group. These modifications ensure that the scheme algorithms are
independent of the index for 1 ≤ i ≤ κ and that e is invariant under all permutations of
its inputs.
The following lemma, which provides a mechanism to compute polynomial values
“in the exponent,” will be helpful in the security analysis of our constructions.
Lemma 3. (Horner in the exponent) Let ω = (ω0, ω1) ∈ Z
2
N and xi = (xi,0, xi,1) ∈
Z
2





for all j, k such that j + k = κ and the explicit values xi , the element [z1 · · · zκ ]T can
be efficiently computed.





(xi,0 · ω0 + xi,1 · ω1) =
∑
j+k=κ










with polynomially many operations. (There are O(κ) summands above.) To obtain these
values, we apply Horner’s rule. Define
Pi (ω0, ω1) :=
{
1 if i = 0 ;
(xi,0 · ω0 + xi,1 · ω1) · Pi−1(ω0, ω1) otherwise.
The coefficients of Pκ are the required p jk values. Let ti denote the number of terms
in Pi . It takes at most 2ti multiplications and ti − 1 additions in ZN to compute the
coefficients of Pi from Pi−1 and xi . Since ti ∈ O(κ), at most O(κ
2) many operations
in total are performed. We note that the lemma generalizes to any (constant) ℓ with
computational complexity O(κℓ). 
We prove the following result formally in “Appendix A.2” and give an overview of
the proof here.
Theorem 2. (κ-SDDH hard ⇒ symmetric (κ, I ∗)-MDDH hard) Write I = I ∗ =
{(i, 1) | i ∈ [κ + 1]} for the index set with all the second components being 1. Let
Γ ∗ denote scheme Γ of Sect. 4 constructed using base group Γ0 and a probabilistic
indistinguishability obfuscator PIO with modifications as described above, and let κ ∈
N. Then, for any ppt adversary A, there are ppt adversaries B1, B2, and B3 of essentially







(λ) + (κ + 1) · Advκ-switchΓ ∗,B3 (λ) .
Proof. In our reduction, the value ω used to generate W will play the role of the implicit
value in the SDDH problem instance. We therefore change the implementation of CMap
to one that does not know ω in the clear and only uses the implicit values [ωi ]0. (Recall
that in our construction GT is just G0, so these elements come from the SDDH instance.)
Such a circuit C∗Map can be efficiently implemented using Horner’s rule above. In more
detail, C∗Map has [ω
i ]T hard-coded in, recovers xi from its inputs using sk1, and then
applies Lemma 3 with (ω0, ω1) := (1, ω) to evaluate the multilinear map.
The proof proceeds along a sequence of κ + 4 games as follows.
Game0: This is the κ-MDDH problem (Fig. 6, right). We use xi and yi
to denote the representation vectors of ai generated within the
sampler SamI (i)(ai ), where (i, I (i)) ∈ I .
Game1–Gameκ+1: In these games, we gradually switch the representations of [ai ]1
for i ∈ [κ + 1] so that they are of the form (ai − ω, 1). Each hop
can be bounded via the Switch game.
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Gameκ+2: This game introduces a conceptual change: the ai for i ∈ [κ + 1]
are generated as ai +ω. Note that the distributions of these values
are still uniform and that the exponent of the MDDH challenge
when b = 1 is
κ+1∏
i=1
(ai + ω) .
This game prepares us for embedding a κ-SDDH challenge and
then to randomize the exponent above.
Gameκ+3: This game switches CMap to C
∗
Map as defined above. We use indis-
tinguishability obfuscation and the fact that these circuits are func-
tionally equivalent to bound this hop. We are now in a setting where
ω is only implicitly known.
Gameκ+4: This game replaces MDDH challenge [ω
κ+1]0 with a random value
[σ ]0 in case b = 1. (Hence, the MDDH challenge is independently
uniform regardless of b.) Observe that Gameκ+3 and Gameκ+4
only require [ωi ]0 (for i ≤ κ + 1) and in fact require [ω
κ+1]0 only
for the MDDH challenge. Hence, we can bound this hop using the
κ-SDDH assumption.
In Gameκ+4, irrespective of the value of b ∈ {0, 1}, the challenge is uniformly and
independently distributed as σ remains outside the view of the adversary. Hence, the
advantage of any (unbounded) adversary in this game is 0. This concludes the sketch
proof. 
We note that in this symmetric case, C∗Map can be directly used as the implementation
of the multilinear map. We chose CMap because it is somewhat simpler and also more
in line with the upcoming asymmetric case.
6.3. The Asymmetric Setting
We describe a second variant of the construction in Sect. 4 that results in an asymmetric
MLG scheme. We set ℓ := 2 and choose the matrix W = (ω1, . . . ,ωκ)
t by setting
ωi := (1, ωi ) for random ωi ∈ ZN .
The following theorem shows that for index set I = {(i, I (i)) : 1 ≤ i ≤ κ + 1} given
by an arbitrary function I : [κ+1] −→ [κ], this construction is (κ, I )-MDDH intractable
under the 1-SDDH assumption in the base group, the security of the obfuscator, and the
κ-Switch game in Sect. 5. We present the proof intuition here and leave the details to
“Appendix A.3.”
Theorem 3. (1-SDDH hard ⇒ asymmetric (κ, I )-MDDH hard) Let Γ ∗ denote
scheme Γ of Sect. 4 constructed using base group Γ0 and a probabilistic indistinguisha-
bility obfuscator PIO with modifications as described above, and let κ ∈ N. Then, for
any ppt adversary A, there are ppt adversaries B1, B2, and B3 such that for all λ




(λ) ≤ Adv1-sddhΓ0,B1 (λ) + Adv
ind
PIO,B2




Proof. The general proof strategy is similar to that of the symmetric case and proceeds
along a sequence of 5 games as follows.
Game0: This is the (κ, I )-MDDH problem. By the pigeon-hole princi-
ple, there must exist a pair of distinct i, i ′ ∈ [κ + 1] such that
I (i) = I (i ′) ∈ [κ]. Without loss of generality, we assume that
I (1) = I (2) = 1.
Game1–Game2: In these games, we gradually switch the representation vectors of
[ai ]1 for i = 1, 2 to those of the form (ai − ω1, 1). Each of these
hops can be bounded via the Switch game.
Game3: This game introduces a conceptual change and generates ai as ai +ω1
for i = 1, 2. The exponent of the MDDH challenge when b = 1 is




Game4: In this game, we change the implementation of CMap to one which
uses all but one of the ωi explicitly, and the remaining one implicitly
via [ω1]0. The new circuit C
∗
Map is functionally equivalent to the
original circuit used in the scheme. We invoke the IO security of the
obfuscator to conclude the hop. This game prepares us to embed a 1-
SDDH challenge next.
Game5: This game replaces MDDH challenge [ω1
2]0 with a random value
[σ ]0 in case b = 1. Observe that Game4 and Game5 only require
[ω1]0 and [ω1
2]0 and in fact require [ω1
2]0 only for the MDDH
challenge. Hence, we can bound the distinguishing advantage in this
hop down to the 1-SDDH game.
In Game5, irrespective of the value of b ∈ {0, 1}, the challenge is uniformly and
independently distributed as σ remains outside the view of the adversary. Hence, the
advantage of any (possibly unbounded) adversary in this game is 0. 
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A. Full Proofs from the Main Body
A.1. Proof of Theorem 1: Indistinguishability of encodings using PIO
Proof. We consider a chain of 10 games, with Game0 being the κ-Switch game, such that in the last game
the challenge encoding is drawn independently of the bit b. Below we let Wi denote the event that Gamei
outputs 1.
Game0: The original Switch game.
Game1: As Game0 but now the public parameters p̃p are changed so that they include a yes-
instance y ∈ TD. We have that




where TD is a language in which membership is hard to decide.
Game2: The public parameters p̂p change so that they include a hiding ĉrs
′, and a (PIO)
obfuscation of circuit ĈAdd. [See Fig. 4 (bottom).] Recall that this circuit uses the
witness wy to y ∈ TD to produce the output proofs π̃
′′. Therefore, the simultaneous
knowledge of decryption keys sk1,sk2 is not needed anymore. Additionally, Game2
uses wy to prepare the proof π in the κ-Switch challenge for A. By Lemma 1 and the
perfect witness-indistinguishability of , we have that




Game3: As Game2, but, if b = 0, the challenge encoding is generated by mixing the repre-
sentation vectors w.r.t public key pk2. Thus, on A’s response (z, (x0, y0), (x1, y1)),
in this game we set c0 ← Enc(x0, pk1; r1), and c1 ← Enc(y1, pk2; r2).




Proof Claim A.1. Consider the following ppt distinguisher B4 against the IND-CPA security of the encryp-
tion scheme , with respect to key pair (pk2, sk2). The distinguisher runs experiment Game2 using A as a
subroutine with the following differences: When it receives A’s vectors (x j , y j ) (in Z
ℓ
p for j = 0, 1), it submits
(y0, y1) to the IND-CPA challenger. It gets back c
∗ = Enc(yr∗ , pk2). Next, B4 generates c1 ← Enc(x0, pk1)
and sets c2 = c
∗; the proof π on instance x = ([z]i , c1, c2) is generated using the simulation trapdoor of the
proof system. Namely, π←$ Sim(crs, x, tdzk ). Finally, B4 outputs what A outputs.
Algorithm B4 perfectly simulates the challenger in experiment Game2 if r
∗ = 0 and in experiment Game3
if r∗ = 1. This follows from the facts that (1) (x, π) is a valid encoding, indeed ciphertext c∗ contains an
encryption of yr∗ , such that [z]i = [〈yr∗ ,ωi 〉]i ; and (2) real and simulated proofs are identically distributed
under (the hiding) ĉrs′ included in p̂p. 
Game4: The public parameters are changed back to p̃p, so that they include a binding crs
′, and
a (PIO) obfuscation of circuit CAdd of Fig. 2 (top). (p̃p also include a yes-instance
y ∈ TD.) Again by Lemma 1, we have that
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Game5: As Game4 but now the public parameters pp are changed back to the original one
described in Sect. 4 so that they include a no-instance y /∈ TD. We have that




where TD is a language where is hard to decide membership.
Game6: As Game5, but now the challenger constructs a different circuit CMap with the sec-
ond encryption secret key hard-coded. Thus, the extracted vector is set to yi ←
Dec(ci,1, sk2). We claim that









, respectively, for any adversarial input x∗ = (x∗1 , . . . , x
∗
κ ).
Observe that the i-th argument x∗
i
= (i, [zi ]0, ci,1, ci,2, πi ) has a non-rejecting proof
πi iff ([zi ]0, ci,1, ci,2) passes relation R1. (In other words, the ciphertexts encrypt
representation vectors of the same [zi ]0.) We remark that at this point, we also use ’s
perfect correctness. Indeed, observe that while R1 implies that there exist encryption
random coins or secret keys that decrypt ci,1 and ci,2 to consistent representation
vectors xi,1 and yi,2, the perfect correctness of  implies that the secret keys used
by CMap retrieve those same representation vectors xi,1 and yi,2. By the definition
of R1, these representation vectors lead to the same outputs of CMap. It follows that
these variants of CMap behave identically on any (possibly malformed) input x
∗.
Therefore, the variants are functionally equivalent and hence trivially drawn by an
X -IND sampler, so that their PIO obfuscations are indistinguishable.
Game7: As Game6 but now the public parameters p̃p are changed so that they include a yes-
instance y ∈ TD. We have that




where TD is a language where is hard to decide membership.
Game8: The public parameters p̂p change so that they include a hiding ĉrs
′, and a (PIO)
obfuscation of circuit ĈAdd. [See Fig. 4 (bottom).] By Lemma 1, we have that




Game9: As Game8, but, if b = 0, the challenge encoding is generated by mixing the repre-
sentation vectors w.r.t public key pk1. Thus, on A’s response (z, (x0, y0), (x1, y1)),
in this game, we set c0 ← Enc(x1, pk1; r1), and c1 ← Enc(y1, pk2; r2). Using a
similar argument as in Claim A.1, we have that




Finally, Pr [W9(λ)] = 1/2 because the challenge encoding is generated using the same pair of representation
vectors (x1, y1) regardless of the bit b. The proof of the theorem is concluded by collecting the terms above.

A.2. Proof of Theorem 2: Hardness of Symmetric MDDH
Proof. We show via a chain of games, starting with the symmetric κ-MDDH problem, such that the last
game chooses the challenge at random and independently of the guess bit b. Below we let Wi denote the event
that Gamei outputs 1.
Game0: The κ-MDDH problem as shown in Fig. 7. Here, there is only one
source group.
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Fig. 7. The symmetric multilinear DDH problem for our MLG scheme. Here, I∗ = {(1, 1), . . . , (κ + 1, 1)} .
Games for 1 ≤ s ≤ κ + 1: As Games−1, the difference is that the representation vectors (xs , ys )
of the sth challenge encoding [as ] are given by
xs,0 = ys,0 = as − ω and xs,1 = ys,1 = 1.
Thus, in game s′ ≥ s, the second coordinates of the sth encoding
vectors are always fixed to 1. Now, a straightforward reduction yields
an adversary B that satisfies:
Claim.
|Pr [Ws−1(λ)] − Pr [Ws (λ)]| ≤ Adv
κ-switch
Γ ∗,B
(λ) for 1 ≤ s ≤ κ + 1 .
Proof. Consider the following ppt adversary B = (B1, B2) against game κ-Switch of Fig. 3. B1 outputs
((xs−1, ys−1), (xs , ys ), s, st) representing a uniform value as in ZN , where (xs−1, ys−1) is as in Games−1
and (xs , ys ) as in Games . B1 can form these vectors because it knows matrix W and as explicitly. Next, B2
receives an encoding [as ]s that has embedded in it vector (xs+b−1, ys+b−1) for a random bit b and uses [as ]s
to simulate Games+b−1. Last, B2 outputs what A outputs.
Gameκ+2: The i th source exponent is changed to a
′
i
= ai + ω for randomly chosen ai ∈ ZN and all
i ∈ [κ + 1]. This means that the target exponent for b = 1 is
d = (a1 + ω) · · · (aκ+1 + ω) (2)
The distribution from which the exponents a′
i
are drawn has not changed and indeed is the
uniform distribution. Therefore, Pr [Wκ+1(λ)] = Pr [Wκ+2(λ)].
Gameκ+3: The differences with the previous game are twofold.
First, for case b = 1, the challenge group element [d]T is generated as in Lemma 3. More
precisely, we first write Eq. (2) as
d = P(ω) ,
where P is a degree κ + 1 polynomial whose coefficients p = (p0, . . . , pκ , pκ+1)
are computed using the iterative rule of Lemma 3, with (xi,0, xi,1) = (ai , 1). Then,
[d]T is obtained by evaluating P at point ω in the exponent using group elements
([1]T , [ω]T , . . . , [ω
κ ]T , [ω
κ+1]T ).
The other difference is that we obfuscate a different circuit C∗Map which has the powers
[ωi ]T hard-coded, for 1 ≤ i ≤ κ . This new circuit extracts the encoding vectors xi from
the inputs, as usual; then, it computes the coefficients of Q(w) =
∏κ
i=1(xi,0 + xi,1ω) by
Lemma 3 and evaluates it at ω in the exponent.
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Fig. 8. The asymmetric multilinear DDH problem for our MLG scheme. Here, I is a function defining the
index set I = (i, I (i)) .
Lemma 3 implies that (1) both circuits are functionally equivalent, and (2) C∗Map is of
size poly(λ). We conclude that obfuscations of these two variants are indistinguishable.
Or putting it differently:
|Pr [Wκ+2(λ)] − Pr [Wκ+3(λ)]| ≤ Adv
ind
PIO,B(λ) .
Gameκ+4: The last game samples the challenge [d]T for case b = 1 as [d]T = [σ ]T for independently
random σ ∈ ZN . A κ-SDDH challenge ([ω
i ]0)i≤κ , [σ ]0) can be used to emulate the
challenger in Gameκ+3 if σ = ω
κ+1, or in Gameκ+4 if σ is random. The latter follows
from the fact that knowing ωi in the exponent for i ∈ [κ + 1] suffices to generate [d]T .
(Recall that GT = G0.) This shows:




To conclude, to see that Pr [Wκ+4] ≤ 1/2, it suffices to observe that the exponent target challenge d is
randomly distributed, regardless of the challenge bit b. 
A.3. Proof of Theorem 3: Hardness of Asymmetric MDDH
Proof. Let I : [κ + 1] −→ [κ] be any function. Slightly abusing notation, we set I = (i, I (i)) for
1 ≤ i ≤ κ + 1. By the pigeon-hole principle, there must exist a pair of distinct i, i ′ ∈ [κ + 1] such that
I (i) = I (i ′) ∈ [κ]. For simplicity, and without loss of generality, we assume that I (1) = I (2) = 1.
We show a chain of games, starting with the asymmetric (κ, I )-MDDH problem, such that the last game
chooses the challenge encoding at random and independently of the challenge bit b. Below we let Wi denote
the event that Gamei outputs 1.
Game0: The asymmetric (κ, I )-MDDH problem as shown in Fig. 8.
Games for s = 1, 2: Similar to Games−1 with the difference that the representation vectors (xs , ys )
of the source encoding [as ]1 are given by
xs,0 = ys,0 = as − ω1 and xs,1 = ys,1 = 1 .
Thus, in game s′ ≥ s, the second coordinates of the sth encoding vectors are
always fixed to 1. Using a similar argument as Claim A.2, we have that




Game3: We change the first two source exponents to a
′
i
= ai + ω1 for randomly
chosen ai ∈ ZN . This means that the target exponent for b = 1 is
d = (a1 + ω1)(a2 + ω1) · a3 · · · aκ+1 .
The first two elements a′
i
are drawn from the uniform distribution, and their
respective representation vectors are (ai , 1) so Pr [W2(λ)] = Pr [W3(λ)].
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Game4: The implementation of CMap is changed. Now, it has hard-coded
[ω1]0, ω2, ω3, . . . , ωκ .
The polynomial P(ω1, . . . , ωκ ) =
∏κ
i=1(xi,0+xi,1ωi )on point (ω1, . . . , ωκ )
can be evaluated in the exponent knowing [ω1]0 and explicit ωi for i ≥ 2.
Since the output of the original CMap is exactly [P(ω1, . . . , ωκ )]T , we con-
clude that
|Pr [W3(λ)] − Pr [W4(λ)]| ≤ Adv
ind
PIO,B(λ) .
Game5: The challenge target d is set to
d = (a1a2 + ω1a2 + ω1a1 + σ) · a3 · · · aκ+1 , (3)
where σ is a fresh random value in ZN .
Note that if σ = ω1
2, then this is precisely the challenge target d in the previ-
ous game. Thus, a 1-SDDH challenge ([ω1]0, [σ ]0) can be used to generate
the pair ([d]T , C
∗
Map) as in Game4 if σ = ω1
2, or as in Game5 if σ is
random. This shows:




To conclude, we have Pr [W5(λ)] ≤ 1/2 + negl(λ). To see this, we argue that d is randomly distributed in ZN
for challenge bit b = 1 with overwhelming probability in λ as follows: If N is prime, then
∏κ+1
j=3 a j has an
inverse in ZN , and therefore, d in Eq. (3) seen as a function of σ and parametrized by a j defines a bijection
in ZN with overwhelming probability. Thus, if σ is uniform so is d. 
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